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Abstract
Development accounting literature usually attributes the observed cross-country vari-
ation in per capita income to differences in countries' factor endowments and total factor
productivity (the Solow residual). While the former can be relatively straightforward in-
terpreted and measured, the latter remains at least partly a black box. In this paper,
we provide a structural interpretation for differences in total factor productivity across
countries and quantitatively explore the role of trade barriers in explaining cross-country
income differences. In particular, we find that giving all countries the same market entry
costs or giving all country-pairs the same variable trade costs reduces inequality by around
13%.
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1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that there is a lot of variation in per capita income across countries.
Development accounting literature explains these differences in per capita income by differences
in countries' factor endowments and technology efficiency (the Solow residual). For instance, in
its most stylized form, development accounting assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function
and compares the variation in incomes that are implied by the measured endowments (human
and physical capital) to the actual variation in the data. This exercise typically finds that
40-50% of the variation can be explained by differing endowments. The remaining variation
∗We thank Josef Zweimüller for helpful comments and discussion. We also gratefully acknowledge finan-
cial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 and the Swiss National Science
Foundation.
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is attributed to exogenous differences in technology, whose nature remains at least partly a
black box. In this paper, we offer a structural interpretation for these technology differences.
In particular, we attempt at answering the following question: How much of the variation in
per capita income across countries can be attributed to differing degrees of integration into the
global trade network?
The framework we use in the paper is a parsimonious synthesis of the recent quantitative ver-
sions of the seminal Melitz (2003) model (see, for instance, Chaney (2008), Eaton, Kortum, and
Kramarz (2011), and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012)). It describes a multi-
country world, where an endogenous set of heterogeneous firms produces tradable intermediates.
These intermediates are bundled with local production factors to produce a non-tradable final
good. Differences in the per capita consumption of the final good across countries are the model
analogue to cross-country variation in real per capita income. In the model, there are several
channels through which per capita income may differ across countries  unequal endowments
and differing population sizes, exogenous technology variation, and trade-related mechanisms.1
Moreover, these channels interact with each other.
The trade-related mechanisms are driven by the presence of two types of trade frictions.
Destination-specific market entry costs require an exporter to invest a fixed amount of resources
before she is able to sell her product in a new market and variable trade costs are proportional
to the quantity that is shipped to a particular market. In order to develop an intuition for the
role of these trade frictions, it is helpful to think of export- and import-related effects. On the
one hand, if the export destinations of a certain country have high entry costs or it is costly
to ship to these countries, demand for this exporting country's production factors is relatively
low, implying that per capita income of the country tends to be low too. On the other hand,
if an importing country has high entry costs or its location is relatively remote, the measure of
available intermediate varieties tends to be low and the prices of the imported varieties tend
to be high. Consequently, the local production cannot benefit too much from the existence of
intermediates, which in turn affects the output of the final good and, therefore, the real income.
Moreover, since intermediates themselves are also inputs in the intermediate production, the
import channel spills back to the export channel.
In order to assess the quantitative relevance of these mechanisms, we calibrate the model
and perform experiments. To quantify the model, we combine data on bilateral trade flows
between countries with the standard endowment data used in development accounting. The
novelty of our approach is that we calibrate/estimate not only the variable trade costs in
the model, but also the market entry costs (using data on the extensive margins of bilateral
1The model of trade developed in the present paper allows for the following effects of integration into the
global trade network on per capita income. First, trade may increase demand for local production factors
and, thereby, factor prices and factor owners' incomes. Second, trade may result in more available varieties in
the economy. If these varieties are intermediates, production becomes more efficient. If the varieties are final
products, the price index in the economy falls increasing the real income of variety-loving consumers. Finally,
trade-induced higher factor prices imply lower contribution margins forcing the least productive firms to exit.
This then leads to a higher aggregate productivity.
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trade flows). This in turn allows us to examine the quantitative role of market entry costs in
determining the cross-country variation of per capita income. We find that the thus quantified
model does a remarkably good job in replicating the actual variations in incomes. In particular,
the cross-country variance of log-incomes in the data is 1.44, while the model predicts 1.53.2
We then perform two types of experiments. First, we consider a counterfactual world where
countries are symmetric except for the calibrated trade frictions. We find that there is almost
no between-country inequality in such a world with the only asymmetries in market access costs
and/or variable trade costs. However, this finding is not sufficient to conclude that there is no
role for trade-related elements in explaining the cross-country variation in incomes. In partic-
ular, trade frictions may only gain relevance when interacting with other asymmetries across
countries. To explore this possibility, we perform a second type of counterfactual experiments,
where we take the calibrated asymmetric countries and assess by how much between-country
inequality is reduced when trade frictions become symmetric. We find that giving all countries
the same market entry costs or giving all country-pairs the same variable trade costs reduces
inequality by around 13%. In this sense, the integration of a country in the global trade net-
work seems to explain only a modest share of the observed variance in per capita incomes.
Nevertheless, this may be of interest for policy-makers, since asymmetries in trade costs can be
influenced immediately to the extent that they are due to regulatory asymmetries.
This paper is closely related to Waugh (2010), Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2009), and
Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2013). These papers adapt the quantitative Ricardian trade
model due to Eaton and Kortum (2002) and perform analysis, which is similar in spirit to the one
conducted in the present paper. In contrast to these studies, the monopolistically competitive
framework adapted in our paper allows in addition for exploring the role of market entry costs
in explaining cross-country differences in per capita income. The potential relevance of entry
costs can be seen from Figure 1 plotting the number of different imported intermediate varieties
against real incomes. The clear positive relationship is apparent and very much contradicts
the Ricardian model that actually predicts a strong negative correlation (see Hepenstrick and
Tarasov (2013)). A natural candidate explanation for the evidences is the presence of market
entry costs that are negatively correlated with per capita income.3
We also compare quantitative predictions regarding cross-country income differences in the
monopolistically competitive framework with those in the Ricardian framework such as the one
developed in Waugh (2010).4 In particular, we find that the two classes of models can deliver
different quantitative predictions even when changing common elements such as variable trade
costs. This suggests that the more weight is given to the quantitative predictions of a model,
the more important it is to check the robustness of these predictions with respect to the market
2The model also slightly overpredicts the 90/10-percentile ratio and slightly underpredicts the 75/25-
percentile ratio.
3An alternative explanation is based on non-homothetic consumer preferences (see Hepenstrick and Tarasov
(2013)). However, preferences matter for consumer goods, rather than for intermediates.
4Note that the structural equations describing the equilibrium in both models look very similar.
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Figure 1: Number of different imported varieties vs. importer income
structure.
The paper also contributes to the very broad development accounting literature surveyed
for example in Caselli (2005) and Hsieh and Klenow (2010). An early paper discussing the
effect of differing intermediate availability on incomes is Romer (1994). Halpern, Koren, and
Szeidl (2009) provide evidence that firms that use intermediates are more productive. More
recently, Jones (2011) shows that allowing for an endogenous set of intermediates in an otherwise
standard growth model explains a much larger share of the cross-country variation in incomes.
This result is also confirmed by the quantitative findings in the present paper: the explanatory
power of the model with intermediates is much higher than that of the standard development
accounting framework.
The paper is also related to the gains from variety literature, implementing Feenstra's (1994)
formula for the price index changes associated with new varieties. Important contributions
include Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006), Broda and Weinstein (2006), and Hummels
and Klenow (2005). Our approach differs from this literature in specifying a fully structural
model that allows us to quantify the relative importance of different elements of the model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the theoret-
ical framework and the equilibrium in the model. Section 3 outlines the calibration strategy.
Section 4 presents the results of the calibration procedure. Section 5 examines the robustness
of the results with respect to different plausible calibrations. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
In the following we propose a simple and tractable quantitative model of the world economy.
At its core are monopolistically competitive firms with heterogeneous productivities producing
tradable intermediates. These intermediates are used as inputs in the intermediate industry
itself and in a competitive final goods industry that produces a homogenous non-tradable
consumption good. The model strongly draws on Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), where
elements that are used to match firm-level facts (firm specific shocks to entry costs and market
penetration costs à la Arkolakis (2010)) are muted for the sake of parsimony.
2.1 Structure of the economy
The world economy consists of N countries. Country i is inhabited by a measure Pi homoge-
neous agents, each endowed with hi efficiency units of labor (human capital) and ki units of
capital. Labor and capital are internationally immobile, but perfectly mobile within countries.
2.1.1 The intermediate industry
The intermediate industry produces differentiated intermediate inputs that are internationally
tradable. Setting up an intermediate firm in country i requires capital k and labor l such that
kαl1−α ≥ αα (1− α)(1−α) f ei . This implies that the setup cost in country i is equal to f ei rαi w1−αi ,
where ri and wi are the cost of capital and labor in country i and f
e
i is a country specific
parameter. After covering this initial setup cost the firm learns its productivity z and can
produce a differentiated intermediate variety with the following CRS technology:
y (z) = z
(
k (z)α l (z)1−α
)β
q (z)1−β ,
where q (z) is a CES-aggregator over all available varieties Ωi,
q(z) =
(ˆ
Ωi
x (j, z)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
.
The firm specific productivity is modeled as a realization of a Pareto random variable Zi:
Pr [Zi ≤ z] = 1− Tiz−θ.
Ti is a country specific parameter governing the lower bound of the productivity distribution
(and thus also the expected productivity) and θ is a shape parameter common to all countries.
There is free entry into the intermediate industry such that in equilibrium total operating
profits just cover aggregate outlays for setup costs.
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2.1.2 International trade
In order to enter a foreign market n producers from country i face two types of costs - fixed
market entry costs and variable trade costs. Market entry requires destination specific labor
and capital inputs such that kαl1−α ≥ αα (1− α)(1−α) fn. For given factor prices an optimizing
firm therefore needs to spend
En = fnr
α
nw
1−α
n
in order to enter market n. For future reference we will call fn as the market entry factor
requirement of country n. Finally, variable trade costs are of the Samuelson iceberg type, i.e.
per dni units shipped in i only one unit arrives at the destination n.
2.1.3 Final goods industry
The final goods industry is competitive and produces a homogenous non-tradable consumption
good. This good is the only quantity that yields utility for the agents. The final goods industry
bundles capital, labor, and intermediates with a intermediate share of (1− γ)
yF =
(
kαF l
1−α
F
)γ
q1−γF .
The final goods industry's intermediate aggregator has the same functional form as the inter-
mediate industry's aggregator.5
2.1.4 Some equilibrium features
The Appendix provides a full derivation and description of the equilibrium in the model. Since
the model is fairly standard, we describe here only the main features and introduce some
notation that will be needed later on.
In equilibrium, each country i has a measure of Ni intermediate producers. The measure of
entering firms is endogenous and adjusts such that the expected profits from entering are equal
to zero. The variable production cost of a firm is given by the local unit costs6
ci =
(
rαi w
1−α
i
)β
P 1−βi
scaled by the firm-specific productivity z, where Pi is the CES-price index in country i.
A firm compares the operating profits from entering a particular market n with the associ-
ated entry cost, En. We define the bilateral cutoff productivity z
∗
ni as the productivity of the
country i firm that just breaks even when entering market n. Firms in country i with produc-
tivities above z∗ni will therefore find it optimal to export to n and firms with lower productivities
5Notice that assuming different elasticities of substitution between varieties of intermediate inputs in the
intermediate and final goods industries does not deliver additional insights in the quantification.
6We omit here and in the following multiplicative constants that will be irrelevant for the quantitative
behavior of the model.
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will choose not to enter this market. In the Appendix, we show that the productivity cutoff is
given by
z∗ni = cidni/c
∗
n,
where c∗n is the destination specific cut-off cost of delivering goods to market n above which
firms find it optimal not to deliver the goods. Specifically,
c∗n =
σ − 1
σ
Pn
(
σ
En
Xn
) 1
1−σ
,
where Xnis total intermediate absorption in country n.
Plugging the cut-off productivity into the country specific productivity distribution yields
the share of i firms that enter n. The extensive margin of trade flows from i to n follows from
multiplying this share with the total measure of firms in i, Ni. In particular, it can be shown
that
mni = NiTi (cidni)−θ (c∗n)θ .
For later use we denote the total measure of intermediate varieties that are available in country
n by Mn =
∑N
i=1mni.
Aggregating over all country i firms' revenues in market n yields the total value of the
trade flow from i to n, Xni. An importing country n demands intermediates as inputs into
its own intermediate production and as inputs for the local final good production. The total
intermediate absorption in country n is equal to the total value of its intermediate demand,
i.e. Xn =
∑N
i=1 Xni. We define the trade share λni as the share of the importing country's
intermediate demand that is met by the supplying country i
λni =
Xni
Xn
.
Balanced trade requires that country i's total exports,
∑
n6=iXni, equal that country's total
imports,
∑
k 6=iXik. Adding the value of intermediate varieties that are bought from local
producers, Xnn, allows us to write the balanced trade condition as
Xi =
N∑
n=1
λniXn.
To summarize, in this model international trade is in intermediates only. The trade patterns
are characterized by the aggregate value of trade flows and their extensive margins and in
equilibrium country's intermediate absorption equals the value of its intermediate production
(balanced trade).
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2.2 Real per capita income
Real per capita income in country n is given by the per capita consumption of the final good
in this country, Un = yF,n/Pn. In the Appendix, we show that the equilibrium real per capita
income can be written as
Un = Ank
αγ
n h
1−αγ
n .
This expression for real per capita income looks very similar to that of the standard development
accounting framework (see e.g. Caselli (2005)) with the difference that An is not a mere residual,
but has a structural interpretation
An = (wn/Pn)
1−γ . (2.1)
How does the fact that countries are integrated in a global trade network affect the wage
rates and the intermediate price indices - and therewith real income - of a country? Let us
consider first the price index, which can be written as (see the Appendix)
Pn =
(
fn
Pn (kn)α (hn)1−α
) 1−σ+θ
θ(σ−1)
(
N∑
i=1
NiTi (cidni)−θ
)− 1
θ
. (2.2)
The term in the first bracket captures a variety effect. The larger a market is (represented by
the aggregate of human and physical capital) relative to market entry costs, the more firms will
enter this market. More entrants in turn lower the price index via the love for variety built into
the CES production function. The second bracket captures the effect of international trade
on prices. The countries' technologies, Ti, are weighted by the local unit costs, the bilateral
distance, and the measure of firms. If a country is favorably positioned in the global trade
network (a favorable position could be low trade costs in general or proximity to technologically
advanced countries or countries with many firms) the average price of the varieties supplied in
its market will be low and correspondingly it will have a low intermediate price index.
Note that assuming that the market entry costs are only destination market specific and
affect local and international producers equally buys us a lot of tractability.7 If entry costs
would be country-pair specific the variety effect would depend on the aggregate of supplier
specific entry costs. Since it is not clear how one would implement such a more general model
empirically, we abstained from modeling such country-pair specific entry costs and chose the
more parsimonious formulation of destination specific entry costs.
The wage rate on the other hand is determined by the global demand for county i labor. To
elaborate on this, we use the fact (shown in the Appendix) that country's total intermediate
absorption, Xn, is proportional to total labor income in this country, wnhnPn. Substituting
7For instance, Tarasov (2012) models market entry costs allowing for both exporter and importer effects.
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this into the balance of payments yields
wihiPi =
N∑
n=1
λnihnPnwn. (2.3)
This equation can be read as a labor market clearing condition with the wage rate adjusting
such that global demand for country i's labor (the left hand side) equals total supply of labor
in country i. Global demand for country i labor is driven by the market sizes of the trading
partners, hnPnwn, and the bilateral trade shares λni. In the Appendix, we show that the trade
shares are proportional to the extensive margin relative to the total number of available varieties
in the importing country, λni = mni/Mn. Substituting for the extensive margins, we can write
λni =
NiTi (cidni)−θ∑N
k=1NkTk (ckdnk)−θ
. (2.4)
Thus, a country tends to have a high wage rate if it has a good technology, if it has a large
number of firms, if the trade costs with its trading partners are low or if unit costs are low (for
example due to a low intermediate price index). A country also has a high equilibrium wage
rate if it is close to large markets so that for given trade shares the demand for its factors is
high.
In summary, international trade affects country's real per capita income through imports
via a lower price index and through exports via high demand for country's factors.
3 Quantification
Having developed a parsimonious model of the global economy, we seek to quantify this model.
This will allow us to compare the model's predicted per capita incomes with the data and later
on to consider the relative importance of the building blocks for explaining the cross country
variation in per capita income.
3.1 Data
To quantify the model, we use data on aggregate values of bilateral trade flows, the extensive
margin of bilateral trade flows, endowments, population sizes, and proxies for variable trade
costs. We calibrate the model to the year 2003. The number of countries in the sample is
determined by the set of countries for which all data is complete. In the following, we briefly
describe the data. Table 1 summarizes the availability of the different data and describes the
resulting data set.
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3.1.1 Aggregate values and the extensive margin of bilateral trade
In order to compute the aggregate values and the extensive margins of bilateral trade, we use
the COMTRADE database as provided by the Centre d'Edutes Prospectives et d'Informations
Internationales (Gaulier, Zignago, Sondjo, Sissoko, and Paillacar, 2010). For the year 2003
this data set provides the dollar values of bilateral trade flows aggregated at the HS6 level
for over 200 economic entities (mostly countries). We consider only HS-categories that are
classified as manufactures in Gaulier, Zignago, Sondjo, Sissoko, and Paillacar (2010), since the
model is one of trade in manufactures.8 Summing over all manufacturing HS-categories, we
get the aggregate value of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, Xni. Counting the number of
manufacturing HS-categories with positive values gives us a measure for the extensive margin
of the bilateral trade flow from i to n, mni. Clearly, it is very likely that the trade flow within
a HS-category is an aggregate over several firms, so that our count measure is only a proxy for
the true extensive margin.9
3.1.2 Endowments and population sizes
Human capital hi is taken from Caselli (2005), who uses the data of Barro and Lee (2001). In
this paper, the authors compute human capital as a piece-wise log-linear function of average
years of schooling of country's population over 25 year. The capital stocks are constructed using
the perpetual inventory method outline in Caselli (2005) and the data on aggregate investments
from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).10 Population sizes are taken from the Worldbank's
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010)
3.1.3 Gross output
GDP measures the total value added in an economy. To quantify this model however, we
need to measure the total value of country's intermediate output,
∑N
n=1Xni. UNIDO (2003)
provides estimates for gross manufacturing output for 77 countries. Additionally, they provide
estimates for the value added in agriculture and manufacturing for 192 economic entities. In
order to impute gross manufacturing output for the countries with value added data, but no
gross output data, we follow Simonovska and Waugh (2012) and run a 3rd order polynomial
regression of gross manufacturing output on the value added shares, GDP, and population size.
8Additionally, we experimented with considering only intermediate manufactures. The results do not sub-
stantially change.
9Even firm level data usually only proxies the true extensive margin, as many firms export several products.
10We take the year 1978 as the initial year. Following Caselli (2005), the initial capital stock is computed as
I1978/ (g + δ), where I1978 is country's aggregate investment in 1978, g is this country's average growth rate in
aggregate investment between 1970 and 1978 and δ = 0.06. Based on this initial capital stock, we then construct
the capital stock for the year 2003 by iterating the capital accumulation function, Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It.
10
Table 1: Data availability and the resulting data set
data availability
data number of countries
trade pattern (Xni, mni) 221
endowments (hi, ki) 104
population sizes 227
gross output - measured 77
gross output - imputed 118
trade cost proxies 224
resulting data set
number of countries 86
% of global GDP 94%
% of global trade volume 80%
3.1.4 Trade cost proxies
Since we do not directly observe the variable bilateral trade costs dni, we estimate these trade
costs. For that we will follow the gravity literature in using the usual proxies - bilateral
distance, a shared border, and speaking the same languages. The corresponding data is from
CEPII (2006).
3.2 Transforming the data into inputs for the quantification
The available data described above requires some manipulation to be useful as an input for the
quantification. These transformations are guided by the theoretical model and are described in
the following.
3.2.1 Total manufacturing absorption and trade shares
We have data on country i's total manufacturing output,
∑N
n=1 Xni. Subtracting the aggregate
value of this country's exports,
∑
n6=iXni, yields i's manufacturing demand, which is met by
local producers, Xii. Adding all imports from countries that are in the sample gives us the
gross value of this country's total intermediate demand, Xi.
11 The bilateral trade shares, λni,
follow immediately by dividing the aggregate value of the bilateral trade flow from i to n by
the importing country total manufacturing absorption, λni = Xni/Xn. The home share, λnn, is
11Note that we subtracted total exports (to countries that are in the sample and countries that are not), as
this yields the residual Xii. However, we add only imports from countries in the sample in order to obtain a
measure for intermediate absorption consistent with the model.
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computed as a residual, λnn = 1−
∑
i 6=n λni.
3.2.2 Wage rates
Since we are interested in the cross-country variation in real per capita income, our sample of
countries we consider is preferred to be as large as possible. At the same time, using actual wage
data would restrict us to considering basically only OECD countries. To avoid this, we follow
Waugh (2010) and take the wage rates that are implied by the general equilibrium. Slightly
rearranging (2.3), we get
wi =
N∑
n=1
λni
hnPn
hiPi wn.
Using the data on population sizes, human capital, and the trade shares derived above, this
represents a linear system that can be solved for the unique set of relative wage rates consistent
with market clearing.
3.2.3 Total measure of locally available varieties, Mn
In the data we observe the measure of imported manufacturing varieties,
∑
i 6=nmni, but not
the measure of locally sourced varieties, mnn. As a result, we cannot directly compute Mn =∑N
i=1 mni. In the following we discuss two methods for imputing the total measure of available
varieties, Mn.
For the first approach remember that the trade share of an exporting country i in the market
n equals the share of varieties that this exporter supplies in market n, λni = mni/Mn. Adding
over all exporters and rearranging yields Mn = (
∑
i 6=nmni)/ (1− λnn). From the above we
know the extensive margins of imports, mni, and the home share λnn, so that we can directly
solve for the implied measure of totally available varieties. An alternative approach combines
and rearranges two expressions for the trade share, λni = Xni/Xn and λni = mni/Mn, to show
that the average intensive margin of country's import flows is proportional to this country's
entry costs (see the Appendix for details)
Xn
Mn
=
Xni
mni
=
σθ
θ − σ + 1En.
Adapting a stochastic version with a multiplicative error for this equation, we obtain an estimate
for log (En) (up to a constant) by regressing log (Xni/mni) on country fixed effects.
12 We
obtain an estimate for Mn by dividing the total intermediate absorption, Xn, by the previously
estimated En.
Figure 2 plots the resulting estimates for Mn against each other. Clearly, the resulting
estimates are highly correlated. In what follows, we use Mn computed using the first approach.
The results remain unchanged when using the alternative estimates for Mn.
12This is of course equal to taking the geometric mean across supplier countries.
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Figure 2: Comparing the two approaches to estimating Mn
3.3 Quantifying the model
The parameters in the model are the countries' endowments, ki and hi, the population sizes,
Pi, the technologies, Ti, the setup costs, f ei , the market entry costs, fi, the matrix of bilateral
trade costs, dni, and the set of parameters common to all countries: α, β, γ, θ, and σ. Some
of the parameters directly correspond to data (ki, hi, and Pi). Others will be estimated using
the preparatory work done in the previous section (Ti, f
e
i , fi, and dni). For the remaining
parameters we will use standard values commonly used in the literature. In the following, we
first describe these standard values and then discuss the estimation strategies for Ti, f
e
i , fi, and
dni.
3.3.1 Labor share, intermediate shares, and trade elasticity
The Pareto shape parameter θ governs the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs. We
use the estimate from Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) of θ = 4.87, which follows from
fitting their model to French firm-level data.13 For the intermediate share in the tradable
manufacturing sector, we follow Waugh (2010) in choosing β = 1/3, which is the average value
13More recently, Simonovska and Waugh (2012) estimate the trade elasticity for a broad set of countries and
provide strong evidence that there is no systematic correlation between the trade elasticity and the level of
country's development - their baseline estimate is θ = 4.5. In Eaton and Kortum (2002), the authors propose
three approaches to estimating θ. The resulting values are 3.6, 8.28, and 12.68.
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Figure 3: Market entry costs, En, and factor requirements, fn
added in UNIDO manufacturing data for 61 countries. We follow Alvarez and Lucas (2007)
in choosing γ = 3/4 and for α we choose α = 1/3 to get the common assumption of a labor
share of 2/3. For the elasticity of substitution finally note that, in contrast to the Ricardian
frameworks used e.g. in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Waugh (2010), the value of the elasticity
of substitution matters a lot for the quantitative behavior of the model. The reason is that the
elasticity of substitution governs the demand elasticity and thus the markups. The markups in
turn determine how many firms find it profitable to enter a market and, therefore, the set of
available varieties. As a baseline we choose σ = 3.4, which is the median value of the elasticities
estimated in Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006). We discuss the sensitivity of the results
with respect to the chosen parameter values in Section 5.
3.3.2 Fixed market entry costs
In order to get estimates for the fixed market entry costs, we use the fact that
Xn
Mn
=
σθ
θ − σ + 1En.
Since we have values for the intermediate absorption and the total measure of available varieties,
we then can calculate the implied market entry costs. The left panel of Figure 3 plots those
against real per capita incomes (as measured in the Penn World Tables, Heston, Summers, and
Aten, 2009). There is clearly a positive relation between per capita income and market entry
costs. However, there are two possible reasons for why En is high: high market entry factor
requirements, fn, or high local factor prices. Whereas the first reason is indeed unambiguously
bad for a country, the second reflects this country's strength. Indeed, the lower a factor re-
quirement for entry, the higher this country's factor productivity and, consequently, its factor
prices.
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In order to isolate the effects, we substitute for En and solve for the factor requirement
(ignoring multiplicative constants):
fn =
1
wn
(
hn
kn
)−α
Xn
Mn
.
Here we use the fact that rn/wnis proportional to hn/kn(see the Appendix). Since we have
data on the relative capital stocks and we computed the wage rates above, we can implement
this equation and construct the implied factor requirements. The right panel of Figure 3 plots
these factor requirements against real per capita incomes revealing that the factor requirements
themselves are clearly negatively correlated with per capita incomes. In the counterfactual
experiments, we assess how important the fact that poor countries have high factor requirements
is for the pattern of between-country inequality.
3.3.3 Variable trade costs
We obtain an empirically implementable gravity equation by normalizing the trade shares with
the importing country's home share
λni
λnn
= (dni)
−θ Si
Sn
,
where Si = NiTic−θi . Since we cannot directly observe the trade costs, we model them as a
function of observables and an exporter fixed effect
−θ log (dni) = dk + b+ l + exi + δni,
where we suppressed the dummy variables for notationally simplicity. dk is the effect of the
bilateral distance being in the interval k. Similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002), the intervals are
(measured in miles) [0, 375), [375, 750), [750, 1500), [1500, 3000), [3000, 6000), and [6000,∞). b
is the effect of sharing a bilateral border and l the effect of having a common language. exi is
an exporter fixed effect. Whereas the explanatory power of this regression would be the same
using importer fixed effects instead, Waugh (2010) demonstrates that exporter fixed effects
yield consistent results along other dimensions, in particular with respect to the price indices
of tradable goods across countries. Inserting the functional assumption about trade costs into
the normalized trade share equation and taking logs yields a linear equation that is straight
forward to implement.
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients and the implied percentage effect on trade costs for
the OLS regression and the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) regression proposed
by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). In our context, the main advantage of the PPML approach is
its ability to use also zero trade flows. This may be relevant in the present sample since 13%
of all possible trade flows are zeros. The correlation between the trade costs implied by OLS
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Table 2: Trade cost coefficients and implied effects
Poisson regression OLS regression
variable coefficient %-effect coefficient %-effect
[375, 750) −0.48∗∗∗ 10% −0.29∗∗∗ 6%
[750, 1500) −0.92∗∗∗ 21% −0.76∗∗∗ 17%
[1500, 3000) −2.20∗∗∗ 57% −1.91∗∗∗ 48%
[3000, 6000) −3.10∗∗∗ 89% −3.10∗∗∗ 89%
[6000,∞) −3.56∗∗∗ 107% −3.96∗∗∗ 125%
shared border 0.27∗∗∗ -5% 0.96∗∗∗ -18%
same language 0.56∗∗∗ -10% 0.92∗∗∗ -17%
and PPML however is high with 0.85. With the estimates based on PPML being less spread
out. In order to preserve comparability with Waugh (2010), we choose to use the trade costs
estimated with OLS.
3.3.4 Technologies
We recover the technologies by using the general equilibrium conditions of the model. Market
clearing requires (2.3) to hold for every country. Substituting for the countries' unit costs in
(2.4), we can write the trade shares as (again, we use the fact that ri/wiis proportional to hi/ki)
λni =
mni∑N
k=1 mnk
=
T˜i
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ
∑N
k=1 T˜k
(
wβkP
1−β
k dnk
)−θ ,
where T˜i = (hi/ki)
−αβθNiTi is a composite of a country's technology, its measure of entrants,
and the ratio of human and physical capital. Moreover, in the Appendix we show that the price
index can be written as follows (ignoring multiplicative constants):
Pi = (Mi)
1
θ
+ 1
1−σ
(
N∑
j=1
T˜j
(
wβj P
1−β
j dij
)−θ)− 1θ
. (3.1)
From the above analysis, we have values for Mi, wi, hi, Pi, dni, and for the parameters β,
σ, and θ. Given these values, we can solve for the (up to a constant) unique vector of T˜i for
which the corresponding price indices and trade shares ensure that all markets clear.14 Note
14In the code, we start with an initial guess for T˜i. Based on this guess, we first compute the implied price
indices. Using these computed indices, we calculate the corresponding trade shares. We plug the trade shares
into the market clearing conditions and check by how much the markets fail to clear. We then adjust the initial
guess using a tâtonnement-like algorithm until all markets clear.
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that it is not possible to identify separately the factor requirement for setting up a firm, f ei ,
and the country's technology, Ti. Indeed, in the Appendix, we show that the mass of entrants,
Ni, is proportional to Pikαi h1−αi /f ei . As a result, having derived the values of T˜i, we can then
only solve for Ti/f
e
i . Hereafter we refer to this ratio as a country's technology.
In the appendix, we also discuss an alternative approach to calibrating the technologies and
show that the resulting technologies are highly correlated with the ones recovered above.
4 Results
In the previous section, we described the calibration procedure and briefly discussed the re-
sulting values. In this section, we now turn to the actual question of this paper - how does
considering the global macro economy help us to understand variations in income that may be
interpreted as pure technological variations using a closed economy framework? To answer this
question, we first compare the global variation in per capita income generated by the model
with the data. Then, we consider the relative importance of different aspects of the model in
explaining global income inequality.
4.1 Comparing global inequality in the model and the data
To calibrate the model, we combined standard endowment data with data on trade flows, but
we did not use data on countries' per capita income. How do the per capita incomes generated
by the model line up with the data? Figure 4 plots the simulated incomes against the data.
As can be seen, the model captures the variation in the data quite well. Indeed, the slope of
the best fit through Figure 4 is 1. To assess the model's performance, one can also compare
the variance in incomes and percentile ratios of the model and the data in the spirit of Caselli
(2005). Table 3 reports the respective values. The model's variance in log-incomes and the
90/10-percentile ratio are slightly too high, whereas the 75/25-percentile ratio is lower than in
the data.
In addition, in the data, there is a strong correlation between the Solow residual and the
capital-labor composite, kαh1−α, with a correlation coefficient of 0.87. The correlation of the
model's analog of the reduced-form TFP, An (see (2.1)), with the capital-labor composite is very
similar with 0.91 (which comes from the presence of intermediate varieties in the production).
To summarize, the model seems to replicate the actual between-country inequality remarkably
well. We now turn to investigate which elements of the model actually drive inequality.
4.2 The Sources of inequality
To discuss the sources of between-country inequality, it is helpful to go back to (2.1). After
some manipulations outlined in the Appendix, it is possible to derive the following expression
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Figure 4: simulated per capita incomes and those in the data
Table 3: Income differences in the model and the data
var (log (U)) p90%/p10% p75%/p25%
data 1.44 25.8 7.7
model 1.53 29.8 6.7
for real income in country n:
Un = (λnn)
− 1−γ
βθ (fn)
− 1−σ+θ
(σ−1)βθ (1−γ)P
1−γ
β(σ−1)
n
(
(kn)
α (hn)
1−α) 1−γβ(σ−1) (Tn
f en
) 1−γ
βθ
kαnh
1−α
n . (4.1)
This expression nicely highlights the different elements of the model and how they affect coun-
try's per capita income. The capital-labor composite, kαnh
1−α
n , is the standard explanatory
variable of the simple development accounting framework. The next term, Tn/f
e
n, represents
exogenous variations in technologies (relative to set-up costs for firms). The third term is a
multiplier on the capital-labor composite coming from the two stage production with love from
variety. The fourth term is a scale effect - larger countries have higher demand and therefore
it is more attractive to enter these markets, which in turn lowers the price index. Similarly,
the market entry factor requirement, fn, affects the measure of entering firms - the lower it
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Table 4: The role of trade-related elements in an otherwise symmetric world
countries are symmetric except for... var (log (U))
... market entry costs, fn 0.01
... trade costs, dni 0.05
... market entry and trade costs 0.08
data 1.44
is, the more firms enter a market for a given size. The last element is the home share, λnn,
that captures the effect of international trade. The lower is the home share, the higher the
benefits from trade and the higher real income Un. Note that all previous elements also affect
the equilibrium value of the home share. Next, we consider the quantitative importance of
some of these elements.
4.2.1 Endowment differences, country sizes, and technologies
In the baseline development accounting framework, endowment differences explain about 40%
of the variance in per capita incomes. In the present model, endowment differences have an
additional effect via the love for variety production functions and the home share. We first
focus on the production function channel. Setting trade costs to infinity (and thus the home
shares to 1) and giving all countries the same technologies, factor requirements, fn and f
e
n, and
population sizes, we can assess the additional explanatory power coming from having a two
stage production process.
The resulting variance in the logs of per capita incomes is 63% relative to the data, which
is significantly higher than the usual 40%. This result is reminiscent of Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992), who find that increasing the weight on capital in the production process helps
replicating the observed differences in per capita incomes. When we additionally allow for
the scale effect by plugging in the actually observed population sizes, we obtain a log-variance
in incomes of 73% relative to the data. Finally, when we additionally allow for technological
differences, the explained variance rises to 77%.
4.2.2 Market access costs and variable trade costs
How important is the imperfect global integration for the patterns of inequality between coun-
tries? In order to assess this question, we make the countries symmetric along all dimensions
except for the market entry factor requirement, fn, and the variable trade costs. In this way,
we preclude interactions between endowments, technologies, and trade related elements of the
model. Table 4 summarizes the results. Clearly, taken for themselves trade barriers seem not
to be that important in generating between-country inequality. If one considers a world with
19
Table 5: Reductions in inequality associated with changes in trade costs
counterfactual experiment % change in var (log (U))
fn =mean{fk}Nk=1 -12.8%
dni = mean {dni}i 6=n -12.6%
above experiments combined -23.7%
symmetric countries except for the calibrated asymmetries in market access costs and vari-
able trade costs, the corresponding log-variance in per capita incomes would be 0.08, which
constitutes about 5.5% of the variance in the data.
However, the real world is not symmetric and a more policy relevant question is therefore
how inequality reacts to changes in market entry and variable trade costs given asymmetries in
endowments, populations, and technologies. The results may differ due to interactions of the
trade-related elements with other asymmetries in the model. Table 5 reports the percentage
changes in the variance of log-incomes that are associated with changes in market entry and
variable trade costs. As can be inferred, given the actual asymmetries in endowments, pop-
ulations, and technologies, introducing symmetry in market entry or variable trade costs has
about the same effect on the cross country variation of per capita income (with a decrease of
13%). This suggests that market entry costs are of the same importance as variable trade costs
in explaining the world inequality.
It must be noted that the resulting reductions in inequality are non-negligible, but rather
small when compared to the reductions that are for example associated with giving all countries
the same endowments of human capital (-31%) or physical capital (-76%). In summary, we
therefore conclude that there is some relevance of asymmetries in market entry and variable
trade costs for understanding the observed between-country inequality. The effects come mostly
from interactions with other asymmetries (endowments and population sizes). In spite of the
relatively small effects, the results may be of interest for policy-makers since asymmetries
in trade costs can be influenced immediately to the extent that they are due to regulatory
asymmetries, whereas policy changes aiming at influencing asymmetries in human or physical
capital require time for the capital stocks to adjust.
4.3 How do the results compare to a Ricardian setup?
The model proposed above features monopolistically competitive firms, market entry costs, and
an endogenous set of firms. The Ricardian model proposed by Waugh (2010) based on Eaton
and Kortum (2002) features perfect competition, no market entry costs, and an exogenous set
of varieties. The resulting structural equations (we outline the corresponding model in the
Appendix), however, look very similar to those resulting from the present model. Indeed, the
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Ricardian model in the spirit of Waugh (2010) and the monopolistic competition model as out-
lined in this paper are emerging as the two most prominent quantitative trade models. Which
of the two frameworks is chosen for a given question is usually a question of parsimony - if the
research question is more concerned with aggregate trade pattern, the simpler Ricardian model
is often chosen, whereas endeavors investigating firm level facts tend to use the monopolistic
competition framework. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) show that both mod-
els belong to a more general class of models, for which the gains from trade (the compensating
variation when comparing trade equilibrium with autarky) are fully summarized by a country's
home share and the trade elasticity.15 However, this does not imply that the predicted changes
in welfare as a reaction to common elements (e.g. variable trade costs or endowments) are the
same, since the home share may adjust differently. In this section, we investigate how different
the quantitative predictions of the two models are.
In terms of the quantification, there are two main differences between the Ricardian and the
monopolistically competitive setup. First, it is the interpretation of the modified technology,
T˜i. In particular, T˜i in the Ricardian setup looks as follows
T˜i = (hi/ki)
−αβθ Ti.
As can be seen, the modified technology in the Ricardian model does not include the mea-
sure of entrants in country i. In the quantification, this implies that the explanatory power
of the endowments is higher in the monopolistically competitive environment, whereas these
additional channels are lumped into technology, Ti, in the Ricardian framework. Moreover, in
the Ricardian framework, the potential cross-country differences in market access costs are also
lumped into technology differences. These facts mean that in the Ricardian setup the role of
technology differences across countries in explaining the cross-country variation in incomes is
overestimated compared to the monopolistic competition framework.
The second difference is the fact that, in the monopolistic competition case, price indices are
scaled by the measure of locally available varieties. Specifically, the price index in the Ricardian
setup is given by
Pi =
(
N∑
k=1
T˜k
(
wβkP
1−β
k dik
)−θ)− 1θ
.
In contrast to the expression for the price index derived in the present model (see (3.1)), the
above price index does not depend on the number of available varieties in the economy.
As long as one does not consider counterfactual experiments with respect to endowments, the
difference in the interpretation of the modified technology does not directly matter. However,
the interaction between the scale effects and trade costs may imply that even experiments
leaving endowments constant yield quite different predictions depending on which framework is
15To be precise, in the context of the present model, the trade elasticity is not sufficient, but we actually need
the combination of trade elasticity and labor shares, − (1− γ) / (βθ).
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Table 6: Comparing the monopolistically competitive and the Ricardian setup
comparison of ability to reproduce the data
var (log (U))
data 1.44
monopolistic competition model 1.53
Ricardian model 1.64
comparison of predicted % reduction in var (log (U))
predictions
experiment monop. comp. Ricardian
dni = mean (dni) -13% -1%
dni = min (dni, din) -20% -19%
dni = mean
(
dOECDni
)
-26% -24%
used. In order to assess if this concern is of quantitative importance, we calibrate the two models
to the data used above and perform three experiments with respect to variable trade costs. The
first experiment gives all country-pairs the same average trade costs, the second experiment is
the experiment in Waugh (2010) of making trade costs symmetric16, and the third experiment
gives all country-pairs the average trade costs among OECD countries. Table 6 summarizes
the results. Concerning the ability of the models to replicate the actual variance in incomes,
both models slightly overpredict it with the Ricardian setup doing so more strongly. In the
counterfactual experiments, the models yield similar predictions for the last two experiments
and very different predictions in the first experiment. Hence, we can conclude that there
are indeed situations where the two classes of quantitative trade models yield very different
predictions and, correspondingly, quantitative work in international trade should check if the
results strongly depend on the chosen model.
5 Sensitivity analysis: alternative parameter values
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our main results with respect to the calibrated
values of the elasticity of substitution, σ, factor shares, α, β, and γ, and the Pareto parameter
θ. The elasticity of substitution governs the gains from variety. The lower is the elasticity
16Remember that we included exporter fixed effects in the gravity equation. This implies that if e.g. Switzer-
land has a lower exporter fixed effect than the US, the trade costs for shipping from the US to Switzerland
are higher than the costs for flows in the other direction. In this experiment, we abolish this asymmetry,
dnewni = min (dni, din).
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis: calibration results for alternative parameter values
changing % of the data's change in var (log (U)) when...
parameter var (log (U)) fn =mean{fk}Nk=1 dni = mean (dni)i 6=n
α 0.25 93% -16% -13%
0.50 137% -8% -11%
β 0.25 105% -13% -26%
0.50 107% -10% 3%
γ 0.70 126% -14% -14%
0.85 74% -9% -10%
θ 3.60 103% -8% -7%
8.28 109% -16% -21%
σ 2.40 119% -20% -23%
5.80 96% -0% -1%
of substitution, the higher the gains, i.e. the variance in income in the model is likely to
increase with lower σ. To get a lower bound for the elasticity of substitution, we choose the
lowest country specific median elasticity from Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006), which
corresponds to the United Kingdom's median elasticity of 2.4. For an upper bound note that
the elasticity of substitution is bounded from above by θ − σ + 1 > 0, which must hold for
the integral representing the price index to converge. For the baseline value of θ this yields an
upper bound for σ of 5.8.
Concerning the labor share, most studies find shares of roughly two thirds. To check for the
sensitivity of our model with respect to α, we choose 0.25 as a lower bound and 0.5 as the upper
bound for α. For β governing the intermediate share in the intermediate industry, we take 0.5
from Alvarez and Lucas (2007) as an upper bound and choose 0.25 as the lower bound. For γ,
which governs the intermediate share in final goods production, we follow the deliberations by
Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and use 0.7 as the lower bound and 0.85 as the upper bound.
The Pareto parameter θ governs the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to trade costs.
There is a relatively wide range of estimated values for the trade elasticity, which is discussed
in Simonovska and Waugh (2012) in detail. We adapt the preferred estimate (8.28) from Eaton
and Kortum (2002) as an upper bound and their low estimate of 3.6 as a lower bound.
Table 7 reports the corresponding calibration results. Column 3 reports the ratio of the
models variance in log-real incomes relative to the variance in the data. The ratio varies be-
tween 74% and 137%. It is particularly sensitive to the capital share, α, and the elasticity of
substitution, σ. Both parameters have effects that are reminiscent of the channel described in
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Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). Columns 4 and 5 report how the results of two counterfactual
experiments change with alternative parameters. The effect of giving all countries symmetric
entry factor requirements is relatively stable across parameter values except for the high elastic-
ity of substitution, whereas the effect of giving all country-pairs the same variable trade costs
varies more. From these sensitivity results, we can conclude that the (modest) relevance of
asymmetries in trade related elements for understanding inequality is mostly confirmed.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a quantitative trade model, which is adapted as a development accounting
tool. The key ingredient of the model is an endogenous set of monopolistically competitive firms
with heterogeneous productivities. The advantage of this framework compared to a Ricardian
world of perfectly competitive firms is the possibility of allowing for fixed market entry costs.
In the paper, we calibrate market entry costs using data on the extensive margin of bilateral
trade flows and find that the market entry costs are negatively correlated with the observed
per capita incomes.
To assess if the asymmetry in market access costs across countries is an important contrib-
utor to between-country inequality, we fully calibrate the model. The resulting quantitative
model of the world economy captures the between-country inequality in income remarkably
well. We then perform a number of counterfactual experiments. In particular, we find that the
asymmetry in market access costs explains a modest amount of between-country inequality -
giving all countries the average entry requirement reduces between-country inequality by 13%.
Giving in addition all country-pairs the same variable trade costs leads to a total reduction in
the inequality of 23%. These effects are relatively small compared to the reductions associated
with equal capital endowments. Nevertheless, they may be of interest to policy makers, since
it is more straightforward to implement entry regulations and tariffs than measures targeting
capital stock formation.
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Appendix
Deriving and characterizing the equilibrium
Bilateral cut-offs, z∗ni
A country i firm with productivity z faces the following demand in country n
pni (z)xni (z) = Xn
(
pni (z)
Pn
)1−σ
,
where Xn is total intermediate absorption in country n and Pn represents the CES price index.
It will be helpful later on to write the price index as a sum of supplying country-specific sub-
indices,
Pn =
(
N∑
i=1
P 1−σni
)1/(1−σ)
,
where the sub-indices Pni are defined by
P 1−σni =
ˆ
Ωni
p (j)1−σ dj.
Given the isoelastic demand, the optimal markup is constant and the optimal price, which a
country i producer with productivity z charges in market n, is given by pni (z) = (σ/ (σ − 1)) cidni/z.
The corresponding operating profits are a constant fraction of revenue: pini (z) = pni (z)xni (z) /σ.
The cut-off firm has a zero contribution margin from entering market n, pini (z
∗
ni) = En. Using
the demand function and optimal pricing, we can solve for the cutoff cost of serving country n,
c∗n, above which firms find it optimal not to enter market n:
c∗n =
σ − 1
σ
Pn
(
σ
En
Xn
) 1
1−σ
.
Note that the cutoff-costs depend only on country n variables, i.e. all exporters have the same
cutoff-costs of entering market n. The cutoff-productivities determined by
z∗ni = cidni/c
∗
n
however differ across supplier countries due to different trade and unit costs.
The price index, Pn, and its components, Pni
By definition, the total value of the trade flows from i to n, Xni, is given by
Xni = mni
ˆ ∞
z∗ni
pni (z)xni (z)µni (z) dz,
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where mni is the extensive margin of trade flows from i to n andµni (z) is the pdf of the
productivities of the producers in i conditional on entering n. Substituting the expression for
firm's revenues, we derive that
Xni = mni
ˆ ∞
z∗ni
Xn
(
pni (z)
Pn
)1−σ
µni (z) dz = XnP
σ−1
n P
1−σ
ni .
Hence, the trade shares (given by Xni/Xn) are proportional to the supplier country's relative
contribution to the price index:
λni =
(
Pni
Pn
)1−σ
.
The more favorable exporting country's prices are relative to all other prices in the destination
market, the higher the bilateral trade share λni.
Recall that the bilateral component of the price index, P 1−σni , is an average price of the
varieties supplied by i in n weighted with the extensive margin of the trade flow from i to n
P 1−σni = mni
ˆ ∞
z∗ni
pni (z)
1−σ µni (z) dz.
Given a Pareto distribution of firms' productivities, the cdf of the productivities of the producers
in i conditional on entering n is equal to
Pr [Zi < z|Zi ≥ z∗ni] =
1− Tiz−θ
Ti(z∗ni)−θ
.
Hence, the pdf function is equal to
µni (z) =
θz−θ−1
(z∗ni)−θ
.
Substituting the expressions for µni (z) and pni (z)
1−σ and integrating, we can write the bilateral
component of the price index as a function of the destination market cutoff c∗n and the extensive
margin of bilateral trade:
P 1−σni =
θ
θ − σ + 1
(
σ
σ − 1c
∗
n
)1−σ
mni.
Adding up the bilateral components yields the actual price index in country n:
Pn =
σ
σ − 1c
∗
n
(
θ
θ − σ + 1Mn
) 1
1−σ
,
where Mn is the total measure of intermediate varieties that are available in country n: Mn =∑N
i=1 mni.
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Another expression for the trade share and total market entry costs
Plugging the expressions for the just derived bilateral component and price index into the above
expression for the trade share, we obtain
λni =
mni
Mn
.
Moreover, taking into account that
c∗n =
σ − 1
σ
Pn
(
σ
En
Xn
) 1
1−σ
and substituting this expression into the above expression for the price index, we can express
the total costs that accrue from firms entering market n as follows:
EnMn = Xn
θ − σ + 1
σθ
. (6.1)
Intermediate absorption
To derive a useful expression for country's total intermediate absorption, we start by noting that
labor income in the competitive final goods sector is wilF,i = γ (1− α) pF,iyF,i, where pF,iis the
price of the final consumption good. Market clearing implies that all income of country's agents
is spent on (locally produced) final goods, pF,iyF,i = (wihi + riki)Pi. Due to the Cobb-Douglas
technology, we can write pF,iyF,i = wihiPi/ (1− α). Combing these deliberations yields the
share of labor and capital, which is employed in the final goods sector, γ = lF,i/ (hiPi) = kF,i/Ki
(here Ki is total endowment of capital in country i equal to kiPi). Since final goods production
is perfectly competitive, γ percent of total revenues in the final goods sector is paid to pay
labor and capital and the remaining (1− γ) percent of revenues is used to buy intermediate
inputs:
QF,i = (1− γ) wihiPi
1− α .
To derive the value of intermediate inputs used in intermediate production , we write a
firm's variable cost, c (z), as a constant fraction of revenues r (z), c (z) = r (z) (σ − 1) /σ.
(1− β) percent of the cost are used to cover intermediate expenses. Thus, the total interme-
diate demand (in value terms) of a country i firm with productivity z is given by Piq (z) =
((1− β) r (z) (σ − 1))/σ. Integrating over all active producers yieldsQI,i = Ri (1− β) (σ − 1) /σ,
where Ri is the total revenues in country i's intermediate sector. Balanced trade implies that
Ri = Xi,
17 so that we can write
QI,i = (1− β) σ − 1
σ
Xi.
17Country i's trade balance is
∑
n 6=iXni =
∑
k 6=iXik. Adding the value of the home supply, Xii, on both
sides yields Ri =
∑N
n=1Xni =
∑N
k=1Xik = Xi.
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Since intermediates are only used in production, market clearing requires Xi = QI,i +QF,i.
Substituting for QF,i and QI,i allows us to solve for country i's intermediate absorption
Xi =
σ (1− γ)
(1 + β (σ − 1)) (1− α)wihiPi. (6.2)
Country's total intermediate absorption is thus a constant fraction of its total labor income.
Number of entrants
In the following, we derive an expression for the measure of entrants in country i, Ni (the
measure of firms that pay the setup costs). For that we define Πn as the total profits that
accrue from sales in market n. They equal operating profits Xn/σ minus aggregate market
entry costs EnMn, i.e.
Πn = Xn/σ − EnMn = Xn (σ − 1) / (σθ) .
Given the Pareto distribution, the level of costs (and therefore prices) does not bear any infor-
mation about the source country. Therefore, the profits are split among the supplier countries
in proportion to the trade shares λni. Free entry thus requires that total set-up costs in i equal
total profits made by active firms
∑N
n=1 λniΠn. From the previous analysis, we can derive that
N∑
n=1
λniΠn =
σ − 1
σθ
N∑
n=1
Xni =
σ − 1
σθ
Xi =
(σ − 1) (1− γ)wihiPi
θ (1 + β (σ − 1)) (1− α) .
The total setup costs in country i are given by Nif ei w1−αi rαi = Nif ei wi (ri/wi)α. Note that
from the equilibrium conditions in the final goods sector,
ri
wi
=
α
1− α
lF,i
kF,i
=
α
1− α
hi
ki
.
As a result, the total setup costs are equal to Nif ei wi (α/ (1− α))α (hi/ki)α. Equating total
setup costs with total profits made by active firms allows us to solve for the measure of entrants
Ni as a function of exogenous variables:
Ni = (σ − 1) (1− γ)
θ (1 + β (σ − 1))
1
(α/ (1− α))α
Pikαi h1−αi
f ei
. (6.3)
Another expression for the price index, Pn
From the above analysis, we have
Pn =
σ
σ − 1c
∗
n
(
θ
θ − σ + 1Mn
) 1
1−σ
.
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Recall that
Mn =
N∑
i=1
mni =
N∑
i=1
NiTi (cidni)−θ (c∗n)θ .
As a result,
Pn =
σ
σ − 1 (c
∗
n)
1+θ/(1−σ)
(
θ
θ − σ + 1
N∑
i=1
NiTi (cidni)−θ
) 1
1−σ
.
Taking into account that
c∗n =
σ − 1
σ
Pn
(
σ
En
Xn
) 1
1−σ
,
it is straightforward to see that
Pn = Φ
(
En
Xn
)(θ+1−σ)/(θ(σ−1))( N∑
i=1
NiTi (cidni)−θ
)− 1
θ
.
where Φis some constant. Finally, using the expressions for the market entry costs, En, and
the intermediate absorption, Xn, yields the expression for the price index in the main text (see
(2.2)).
Real per capita income
Country n's real per capita income is
Un =
yF,n
Pn =
rnkn + wnhn
pF,n
.
As rnkn = wnhnα/(1− α),
Un =
wnhn/(1− α)
pF,n
.
The unit costs in the final goods sector are (ignoring constants)
pF,n =
(
rαnw
1−α
n
)γ
P 1−γn .
Using this together with rαnw
1−α
n = (α/ (1− α))α (hn/kn)αwn allows us to write the real income
(ignoring irrelevant multiplicative constants) as
Un =
(
wn
Pn
)1−γ
kαγn h
1−αγ
n .
To derive (4.1), note that a country n's home share is
λnn =
T˜n
(
wβnP
1−β
n
)−θ∑N
k=1 T˜k
(
wβkP
1−β
k dnk
)−θ .
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Using equation (2.2), we can substitute for the sum in the denominator, which in turn results
in
λnn =
(
fn
Pn (kn)α (hn)1−α
)− 1−σ+θ
(σ−1)
T˜n
(
wn
Pn
)−βθ
.
Rearranging and substituting for T˜n then yields
wn
Pn
= (λnn)
− 1
βθ (fn)
− 1−σ+θ
(σ−1)βθ
(Pn (kn)α (hn)1−α) 1β(σ−1) (Tn
f en
) 1
βθ
.
Inserting this into (2.1) and then into the expression for the real income, we get (4.1) .
An alternative approach to calibrating the technologies
Instead of imposing market clearing to recover the technologies, one can follow Waugh (2010)
and use the country effects Si = log
(
T˜i
(
wβi P
1−β
i
)−θ)
estimated in the gravity equation, Ŝi.
Based on these we then compute the implied price indices
P̂n = (Mn)
1
θ
+ 1
1−σ
(
N∑
k=1
exp
(
Ŝk
)
d−θnk
)− 1
θ
.
The correlation between the thus obtained price indices and the equilibrium price indices that
follow from the approach in the main text is very high with 0.93. Using these price indices and
the wage rates, we can then solve for the implied reduced form technologies,
̂˜
T i =
(
wβi P̂
1−β
i
)θ
exp
(
Ŝi
)
.
The correlation between these technologies and those obtained in the main text is high as well
with 0.91.
The Ricardian analogue (Waugh, 2010)
In this subsection of the Appendix, we briefly outline the Ricardian model of trade proposed by
Waugh (2010) and highlight some of the differences and commonalities. Similar to the model
in the main text, the world consists of N countries. Country i is inhabited by measure Pi
homogeneous agents, each endowed with hi efficiency units of labor (human capital) and ki
units of capital. Labor and capital are internationally immobile, but perfectly mobile within
countries. There are two industries. The final goods industry produces a homogeneous non-
tradable consumption good using a CRS technology
yF =
(
kαF l
1−α
F
)γ
q1−γF ,
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whereas the competitive intermediate goods industry produces tradable differentiated interme-
diate goods (indexed by j) using the following production function
y (zi(j)) = zi(j)
(
k (zi(j))
α l (zi(j))
1−α)β q (zi(j))1−β ,
where zi(j) is country specific and modeled as a draw from a country-specific Fréchet distribu-
tion
Fi (z) = Pr [Zi (j) ≤ z] = exp
{−Tiz−θ} .
Trade is costly in the sense of bilateral iceberg trade costs, dni. However, there are no fixed
market entry costs.
Given these assumptions, the equilibrium is characterized by a market clearing condition
wi =
N∑
n=1
λni
hnPn
hiPi wn,
where the bilateral trade shares are
λni =
T˜i
(
wβi P
1−β
i dni
)−θ
∑N
k=1 T˜k
(
wβkP
1−β
k dnk
)−θ .
Note that in the Ricardian setup T˜i has a different interpretation
T˜i = (hi/ki)
−αβθ Ti.
That is, compared to the monopolistic competition framework, T˜i does not include the measure
of entrants in country i. In addition, the price index does not depend on the number of available
varieties in the economy and, therefore, on the market access costs. Specifically, the price index
in the Ricardian setup is given by
Pi =
(
N∑
k=1
T˜k
(
wβkP
1−β
k dik
)−θ)− 1θ
.
In the main text, we investigate how these differences affect the quantitative behavior of
the models. Notice that it is straightforward to adapt the quantification strategy outlined in
the main text to the Ricardian framework.
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